The Historical Roots and Identities of Local Strongmen Groups in Indonesia by Pribadi, Yanwar
The Historical Roots and Identities of Local Strongmen 
Groups in Indonesia 
Yanwar Pribadi 1
Abstract 
This paper deals with the historical roots and identities, nature and 
characteristics of local strongmen groups in Indonesia, and aspects of 
violence in Indonesia. In the rural colonial Java, there were rampok-bandits 
and jago groups; whereas today in Banten there are jawara groups and 
elsewhere in Indonesia people commonly recognized preman groups. In this 
paper I will focus on these four groups: rampok-bandits (or bandits), jago, 
jawara, and preman. These groups are parts of the long-established 
strongmen groups that have characterized Indonesian history. Among the 
questions addressed are: what is the origin and what are the characteristics 
of local strongmen groups in society? How does violence embody in the way 
of life of local strongmen groups? What is their position in society? How do 
they characterize local cultures in their place of origin? 
Keywords: Rampok-bandits, Jago, Jawara, Preman, Violence 
"Saya seorang jawara" (I am a jawara) 
-Tubagus Chasan Sochib (Tempo Interaktif, 3 December 2007)
A. Introduction
Perhaps there is no such bold and outspoken public figure in 
Banten after the collapse of the Suharto administration besides Tubagus 
Chasan Sochib. He was a successful tycoon and a legendary figure in the 
jawara world in Banten, who happened to be the father of Ratu Atut 
Chosiyah, a former of Banten. 
This paper deals with the historical roots and identities, nature and 
characteristics of local strongmen groups in Indonesia, and aspects of 
violence in Indonesia. Among the questions addressed are: what is the 
origin and what are the characteristics of local strongmen groups in society? 
How does violence embody in the way of life of local strongmen groups? 
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What is their position in society? How do they characterize local cultures in 
their place of origin? 
In the rural colonial Java, there were rampok-bandits and jago groups; 
whereas today in Banten there are jawara groups and elsewhere in 
Indonesia people commonly recognized preman groups. These groups are 
parts of the long-established strongmen groups that have characterized 
Indonesian history. In general, strongmen groups have been identifiable in 
many places in Indonesia. However, I will not discuss strongmen groups 
outside Java. Consequently, in this paper I will focus on these four groups 
only: rampok-bandits (or bandits), jago, jawara, and preman. One has to 
perceive these local strongmen groups different from strongmen in politics. 
The latter exercises authority through money and social control, whilst the 
former can be seen as a sub-type of local gangster who benefits from his 
fearsome and held-in-awe reputation in order to reap economic benefits and 
political influence. 
B. Indonesian experiences with violence
Several authors have observed aspects of violence in Indonesia. 
Ingrid Wessel considers violence in Indonesia as the legacy of the New 
Order although she believes that the struggle for manpower and goods, for 
access to trade and the struggle against enemies in pre-colonial times were 
always connected with violence. 2 Henk Schulte Nordholt best portrayed the 
creation of a state of violence by the Dutch colonial government. 3 Freek 
Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad support this argument by stressing that 
violence has deep historical roots long before the Suharto administration 
came into being.4 Kees van Dijk collects the explanations that caused 
explosions of violence in the New Order: 1910s when Sarekat Islam was 
established following the anti-Chinese sentiment, the 1948 and 1965-1966 
. massacres, the Darul Islam rebellion, and the early months of Indonesian 
revolution.5 Meanwhile, Ariel Heryanto proposes 'state terrorism' to label 
prevailing violence during the Suharto era. He argues that the mass killings 
of 1965-1966 were the foundation of the authoritarian style of the New 
Order.6 
A struggle for power using physical force and assault causing bodily 
injury to others can lead to the implementation of political violence. It was 
partly the outcome of voe' s quest during the last decades of the
seventeenth century in Malaka, Makassar and Banten and the mounting 
expansion of colonial administration in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries that led to the massively-shared violence experienced by 
Indonesians. One of the reasons was the lack of staff and of a regular police 
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force. Moreover, it was the colonial and local authorities that to a large 
extent provided criminals with opportunities to maintain their power . 7 The 
state of violence was not only indicated by strongly repressive actions of the 
Dutch command in waging wars in the Netherlands East Indies or in 
responding movements of peasant unrest that marked the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries Java, but also by the implementation of discriminatory 
laws. The Dutch authority reinforced and undermined the priyayi (local 
aristocracies) class. By incorporating the regent and his sons into the 
administration, the colonial rulers provided them with Western 
bureaucratic standing and authority and detached them from the 
patrimonial system in which they played an integral part. Priyayi and some 
indigenous high administrative and military administrators were brought 
under the purview of the European procedural code, while native 
commoners-those who rose against oppressions caused by the increased 
taxes, revenues, or services demanded of them-along with the Chinese, 
Arabs and Indians (The Dutch authority named these groups 'Foreign 
Orientals') were subject to different legal arrangements established for 
natives (adat law). This distinction based on a person's racial status 
determined where one could live, what taxes one paid, and how one was 
punished. Ironically, the later Indonesian political elites adopted the most 
repressive side of colonial legal structure. 8 In addition, Siegel offers another 
way to view the roles of criminals in the colonial period. Accounts written 
by Eurasians (multiracial individuals, mostly of European and Indonesian) 
on criminalities and criminals were abundant and as these Indo people 
were losing contact with their Dutch fathers during the end of the 
nineteenth and at the onset of the twentieth century, they attempted to 
align themselves with the Dutch administration against criminals who were 
depicted by them as natives.9 
Aspects of violence in Indonesia arose from the peculiar set of 
indigenous elements of Indonesian society and the conservative Dutch 
administration system that governed the affairs of the subordinate bodies of 
native bureaucrats. I would assert that although Indonesians (or Javanese, 
for they have been the majority in Indonesia) have been portrayed as 'a 
palladium of peace' 10 or 'the meekest people in the world' 11 or 'the most 
gentle people on earth';' 2 and Indonesia has been ranked 67 th in 2010 
Global Peace Index, 13 above People· s Republic of China (80th) , The United 
States of America (85 th) and India ( 128 th) as the four most populous 
countries in the world that comprise around forty-five per cent of world 
population, Indonesia is a violent country. Pre-colonial Indonesia was 
marked by banditry and its repression. The development of banditry was 
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endorsed by the weakness of traditional states in the archipelago in 
maintaining peace and order. The periods of shortage and unfavorable 
crises of droughts, floods, epidemics, strong winds and heavy rains at 
harvest or animals that devastated the crop worsened the circumstances. 
Banditry was mostly directed against property and people. In this case, we 
can assume that people here mean peasants. Poor peasants whose 
household had little scope for maximizing profit were their easiest prey. As 
a result of this flaw, the weak authorities attempted to solve problems of 
crime by violence. Moreover, pre-colonial times also recognized extinct 
violent traditions. Colombijn analyzed two examples of them: the 
headhunting and running amok. 14 I shall add carok, a Madurese tradition of 
fighting in the name of honor that still exists up to present day. 
Furthermore, after the Europeans came and particularly after the Dutch 
East Indies Company (VOC) sought to establish trade monopolies by 
conquering strategic places, the Dutch worsened the weakness of traditional 
states. VOC · s aggressive expansions in sources of spices or vital seaports in 
Malaka, Maluku, Makassar and Banten were marked by wars and violence. 
Like many other Governor-Generals of the Netherlands East Indies, Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen was regarded as national hero in the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, for many natives he was seen as one of the most violent 
administrators of VOC. 15 Besides the colonial wars waged after the Dutch 
established the Netherlands East Indies, the construction of De Groote
Postweg or the Great Mail Road connecting Anyer in west Java and 
Panarukan in east Java (later it connected Anyer with Banyuwangi) that cost 
the lives of thousands of unpaid indigenous laborers, was also a period of 
violence. The architect of the road, Herman Willem Daendels or 'Tuan 
Besar Guntur' (Mister Thunder) as local population would call him, was 
seen as an authoritarian 'Iron Marshall' .16 
The nineteenth and early twentieth century Java witnessed series of 
rural unrests. Sartono Kartodirdjo seemed to simplify the causes of many 
peasant unrests as he pointed out most to economic factors. In his magnum 
opus of Cilegon revolt of 1888, he examined a religious revival in 
nineteenth century Banten. The increase of religious activities was not only 
due to the fact that the people were pious adherents of Islam, but also due 
to the fact that there was disruption of traditional order and, 
concomitantly, enduring social unrest and thus, the religious revival in 
Banten can be identified as a religious-political movement, which 
accommodated various social strains. However, the religious revival became 
a means of recruiting people for rebellion, rather than a purely religious 
movement. 17 However, in another work he stressed the significance of 
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religious groups who were treated with distrust by authorities and 
underlined their potential for conducting political agitation and hostility 
toward the priyayi and the Dutch power. 18 Nonetheless, I would argue that 
the uprisings can also be regarded as religious movements, because religious 
institutions, such as tarekat (Muslim brotherhood) and communities played 
some part in these movements. The possible triggers perhaps can be 
identified as the resentment against the Dutch domination and the 
powerful hostility towards foreigners, which also found outlet in allegiance 
with extremist religious movements. 19 
If one asks the most violent period in Indonesia before the Suharto 
administration came into being, Smail, 20 Anderson, 21 Reid,22, Lucas,23, 
Robinson, 24 and Cribb25 may seek explanations in the Indonesian 
revolution from the early months of the war of independence until the 
recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949 when a number of history 
makers competed in a struggle for power. Analysis of the revolution has 
grown in sophistication and in its grasp of the complexity of forces 
involved. The revolution witnessed a significant number of social unrests. 
Indonesia during those disturbances was in a route to freedom as factions 
of the country's political elites and bands of armed revolutionaries 
challenged the foreign forces to replace the old Indies social and political 
system. Deeply oppressed by colonialists marked by a ready use of violence 
for hundred years, the revolutionaries responded by spreading terror, 
causing numerous victims in both sides. The whole process of  
independence was traumatic for the whole archipelago. The revolution 
period hardly brought social harmony. Sufficient explanations with looking 
at the socio-economic background, political context, leadership, ideology 
and military affairs should be drawn to assess such a period. 
When we discuss the Indonesian revolution, we cannot speak 
enough about the number of people who were set to fight and die in 
defense of  the nation or how the foreign rulers attempted to acquire their 
former colonies back. It was true that in the name of national identity, 
other manifold and somewhat overlapping identities such as those based on 
class, ethnicity and religion were also noticeable. Furthermore, in many 
other national revolutions, the intensity of people's devotion and 
dedication is also a striking fact that usually accompanies their commitment 
that leads them to devote and sacrifice themselves to the nation. This 
proposition is corresponding with Benedict Anderson's 'imagined political 
community', as he argues that the imagined political community enables 
people to share a common identity with other people they have never met, 
are never likely to see, meet, or talk to. 26 The Indonesian revolution is 
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absolutely a heroic period in Indonesian history. Students of elementary 
school through high school are taught how patriotic the Indonesian 
freedom fighters were. The courage of the youth is symbolized in bamboo 
spears and red-white bandana. The 1 7 August Independence Day is always 
celebrated in almost all parts of Indonesia, and thus creates an unbalanced 
history. Banditries, militias, rage, frenzy and violence during the blood-
spattered national revolution have yet to locate a place in Indonesian 
history. 27 In fact, it was in this period that brigands found their momentous 
times. Criminality was rampant as the relationship between state and 
criminals was ambiguous. In Jakarta, gangsters and young left-wing 
nationalists formed a coalition that played a significant role between 1945 
and 1949. This coalition remarkably survived even though the revolution 
came to an end, despite the suppression from the Dutch power and the 
Indonesian authority. 28 
What actually made the prevailing attitude among the youth during 
the revolution survived? The answer-in line with 'imagined political 
community'-may be found in the 'national identity'. It has been argued 
that national identity is derived from the concept of a shared homeland, 
historical memory and common myths and plays important parts in 
elements of ethnic community, such as a shared sense of solidarity. 29 It is in 
this sense that the pemuda (the youth) pressed the Japanese authorities to 
shift more rapidly toward independence and criticized older founding 
fathers for their timidity and passivity in responding to the changing 
situation. For the pemuda, an immediate and autonomous proclamation was 
very important for its own sake, as a symbolic expression of liberation and 
self-determination. 30 
The pemuda, everywhere in Java, along with ordinary crowds took 
over control from the Japanese after August 1945. They usually began with 
the government offices on which attention had been concentrated. Soon, 
however, the movement spread wider to include everything controlled by 
the Japanese. In Bandung, the radical time began with the seizure of 
government offices. Organized groups of pemuda within the offices 
themselves were responsible for this action. In the course of six months of 
violence, vast shifts had taken place in the social and political order of the 
Bandung area, some of which were to be permanent. Like any other area, 
the national revolution in Bandung was also a period of violence. 3 1 
Abductions, assaults, rape and arson were almost daily realities. These were 
directed towards the Dutch, Chinese, and all other foreigners as well as ex 
power-holder of Indonesian aristocracies who were seen as traitors. 32 The 
pemuda organized themselves into local groups agitating society and 
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terrorized villages. There were also regional armed forces in many parts of 
the country whereas Muslim groups unified themselves in Hizbullah and 
Sabilillah groups, while romanticized bands identified themselves with 
names such as Beruang Merah (Red Bear), Harimau Liar (Wild Tiger) and 
Banteng Hitam (Black Wild Bull).33 In Jakarta, the Japanese occupation 
provided the underworld its first taste of the opportunities offered by major 
political change. Bands of militia directed their attentions to the newly 
vulnerable houses of landlords and merchants. Death squads in south of 
Batavia found Europeans and Chinese residents of the city who fled for the 
mountains, while to the east the main victims were local Chinese. 34 In 
addition, the revolutionaries also directed their strikes against armed forces. 
For example, on 19 October 1945, eighty-six Japanese naval guards who 
were on their way to be interned in Ciater were slaughtered in Bekasi. A 
month later, on 23 November, a squad of British Indian troops was 
massacred after their Dakota had crashed near Bekasi. 35 
How is it possible that under certain conditions, 'national identity' 
would promote violence? The nation and the state are linked to the effort 
for national self-determination, in the name of authority, territory, and 
political power. This leads to primary possibility of violence due to the 
chance of loss control of the state and the domination of force and rule 
over the territory. This is well demonstrated in the concept of political 
autonomy.36 The concept of political autonomy is perhaps well suited in the 
political conflict in Bali during the first year of the revolution. Riot, 
turmoil, disorder and disarray were prevalent and terror took on serious 
proportions when the Dutch troops arrived in March 1946. It seems clear 
that the kingdoms in Bali declined into chaos and political conflict as a 
result of strong resistance on many parts of the island to the return of the 
Europeans. 37 Hence, competition, conflict and violence between countries 
have been central to the historical emergence of nation states as were 
evident in the Bali case. 
Undoubtedly, twenty years after the Indonesian independence we 
saw the inauguration of the most violent period in the country's history. 
The New Order era that replaced the Old Order period was established as a 
result of a coup and massacre that took lives of half a million to a million 
human beings. The killings were results of a failed revolution in what is 
known as Gerakan 30 September/PK! (G30S/PKI). Subsequently, the 
alleged members of the Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia - PKI) 
became victims of the massacre. The party and the ideology, including the 
supporters were eliminated from the country. Even though the army 
encouraged the killings, the large parts of the massacre were executed by 
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armed forces-incited civilians, such as the youth section of Nahdlatul 
Ulama, Ansor. In Bali, the most notorious groups of killers were tameng. 
They consisted of militant Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) youths dressed 
in black shirts and armed with knives, spears and firearms. Ansor from East 
Java also took part in the killings. 38 
The killings paved the way for the new administration and created 
'state terrorism' to refer to violence demonstrated in the new period. 39 
Although the new rule was authoritarian in nature, they made little attempt 
to monitor the implementation of laws in the lower level of society. A 
strong vigilantism tradition in which local communities became accustomed 
to autonomy in identifying and punishing crime was able to exist. The 
massacre of 1965-1966 took place and was justified by the idea of 
vigilantism. 40 
Another violent feature in the history of the New Order period was 
the attempted genocide of East Timor that began in 1976. A successful 
campaign in 1975 and the annexation in 1976 brought East Timor to the 
possession of Indonesia. Subsequently, the East Timorese carried out 
resistance. The Indonesian armed forces responded by perpetrating military 
campaign until about 1980. The occupation was estimated to have about 
200,000 deaths. One of the reasons behind the invasion of East Timor was 
that the Suharto administration was afraid that a left-wing East Timorese 
might provide a safe place for resurgent Indonesian communists. This fear 
was directed toward Fretilin, a local faction in East Timor. 4 1 Although the 
time of extreme political tension in 1965-1966 was not comparable to that 
of the East Timor massacre period, it seems that communism was an 
archenemy of the Suharto administration. Consequently, all actions related 
to communism or suspected of having communism aspects were directly 
eradicated, making the government very repressive in nature. 
The New Order government seemed to be able to penetrate deeper 
into society and to dominate local society to a much greater extent than its 
colonial predecessor. The New Order also marked the beginning of a long 
period of neo-colonial rule. Furthermore, despite the apparent dominance 
of the center, the regional elites showed tremendous resilience and 
managed to survive. Apart from appointing military and ex-military to 
strategic positions, the government also appointed its local agents among 
the descendants of the old aristocracies. In many places the new 
government and the old elite shared a hatred for leftist and Islamic 
movements.42 Komando Jihad (1977), Jama'ah Imran Movement (1981), 
The Tanjung Priok Riot (1984) and GPK Warsidi Lampung (1989) were 
some examples of how the leftist and Islamic movements reacted toward the 
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New Order's anti Islam policy. However, the government was too powerful 
for them. Accused of organizing efforts to establish an Islamic state and o f  
rejecting Pancasila as the sole ideology, they were effectively suppressed by 
the government. 
In sum, the historical roots of  violence in Indonesia can be traced 
back to the pre-colonial times when the use of  violence was socially and 
culturally legitimated by the prevailing norms and values as demonstrated in 
headhunting, running amok or carok. Nevertheless, I do not suggest that 
Indonesians are violent in nature. It was the symbolic action o f  the natives 
when they expressed their ways of  ritualistic behaviors, ultimate vindication 
of  honor and simply the messages people wanted to convey. The more 
institutionalized violence then was introduced by the foreign rulers o f  
Europeans-and later the Japanese-when colonial expansion created the 
state of  violence. 
C. Bandits in Colonial Java 
Rural people in Indonesia were vulnerable. In Java, during the 
Dutch colonial period there was enough population pressure to keep 
incomes low and underemployment common. People in the countryside 
were poorly connected with each other. During this time when emigration 
was difficult and the protection o f  the central state uncertain, rural 
inhabitants remained eminently vulnerable. At this time, banditry was 
rampant and strongmen took advantage of weak law enforcement, 
challenging the reputation of  the island as a place of  safety. Moreover, it was 
the colonial authority that to a large extent provided criminals with 
opportunities to maintain their power.43 
When discussing banditry, one may notice E.J. Hobsbawm. He 
coined the term 'social banditry' in Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms 
of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries.44 He further developed it in 
Bandits.45 He suggested that: 'social banditry is universally found, wherever 
societies are based on agriculture (including pastoral economies), and 
consist largely o f  peasants and landless laborers who are ruled, oppressed 
and exploited by someone else, such as lords, towns, governments, lawyers, 
or even banks'. This Marxist historian distinguished three types of  banditry: 
the noble robber or Robin Hood type, the primitive resistance fighter or 
guerrilla unit and the terror-bringing avenger.46 Furthermore, he also dealt 
with three aspects of  banditry: "1. A phenomenon of  social discontent, or 
closely connected with it; 2.The curious but significant coexistence o f  
banditry with more ambitious or general movements of  social insurrection; 
and 3.The rather backward and primitive situations in which banditry is 
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found to play the role of  a movement or phenomenon of social protest and 
rebellion".47 Hobsbawm is persistent in his arguments. In his three works, 
he repeatedly stated that social bandits are outlaws, people living in the 
peasant society who are regarded as criminals by the state but not by the 
peasantry since their enemies are the same as the peasants. In fact, peasants 
see them as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice and such 
addressed-labels lead to the admiration of social bandits by the peasantry.48 
The relation between peasants and bandits makes banditry 'social'. He 
stressed the important roles of peasants as groups where the bandits come 
from and he further emphasized how peasants become fiery supporters of 
the bandits based on their same adversaries.49 
One of Hobsbawm · s critics, Anton Blok, suggests that bandits often 
terrorize the poor and the weak and that interdependencies between lords, 
peasants and bandits are far more complex than social banditry, and thus 
Hobsbawm · s social bandit is closer to myths and legends than to reality.so 
Moreover, Blok argues that all bandits are 'social' like all human beings and 
they are linked to other people by various ties. To understand the behavior 
of bandits, one needs to look at other groups, classes or networks with 
which bandits form specific configurations of interdependent individuals. It 
means that bandits need protection in order to operate and to survive.s 1 
Blok objects to Hobsbawm · s too much attention on the peasants and the 
bandits themselves. 
Another Hobsbawm · s critic, Pat O'Malley, also questions the term 
'peasantry' who support social bandits as well as the term 'pre-capitalist' or 
'pre-industrial' that is regarded by Hobsbawm as 'conditions which are 
necessary for the existence of social banditry'.s2 To show us that brigandage 
can happen outside the peasantry world and in fact appears in capitalistic 
society, O'Malley portrays the Ned Kelly gang and the land struggle between 
1878 and 1880 in Australia. Kelly gang was supported by the bush 
telegraph, a network of informants who provided detailed information 
about police's movements. These informants consisted of the selectors 
(small farmers) and rural workers. From here, O'Malley has argued that 
Kelly's resistance was a class struggle, considering the fact that besides the 
police who became their main adversaries, the squatters (large-scale, 
bourgeois pastoralists) and the professionals (lawyers, school teachers et 
cetera.) were also the opponents of  the bushrangers (Kelly and the gang). 
O'Malley concludes that the modus operandi of Kelly gang reflected that of  
Robin Hood; battling against the enemy of  the poor. Consequently, they 
gained respect and support from the unfortunate. Ned Kelly typically 
represented what Hobsbawm called social bandits. However, Kelly did not 
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exist in 'pre-capitalist' or 'traditional peasant' environments where 
Hobsbawm repeatedly advocated as conditions where social bandits can 
operate. Furthermore, the selectors cannot be classified as 'traditional 
peasants' since they were heavily involved in capitalist agriculture and allied 
with the rural working class. More importantly, Australia in the end of the 
nineteenth century was an advanced capitalist region. All of his arguments 
seem to deny that of Hobsbawm on peasants, capitalism and banditry.53 
Looking back to Hobsbawm's proposition, he distinguished social 
banditry from two kinds of rural crime: the activities of gangs drawn from 
the professional underworld (common robbers) and communities for whom 
raiding is part of the normal way of life. 54 How did social banditry in Java 
take place? In order to do understand it, we firstly need to discover who the 
bandits in rural Java were. Nevertheless, the ideal and romantic bandit-types 
according to Hobsbawm barely existed in rural Java. Two novels from the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century by well-informed Dutch writers 
in the Netherlands East Indies may give us comprehensible pictures about 
banditry in Java. Isaac Groneman and P.C.C. Hansen Jr. or his pseudonym 
Boeka with their Een Ketjoegeschiedenis and Pah Troeno respectively, were 
aware of what was happening in the island. Groneman spoke about kecu 
group or bandit gangs that were widespread and were recognized by the 
Dutch authority as roverbende, bendewezen, roverij or roofpartij to denote these 
groups. Kecu were groups consisted of usually more than ten men. There 
were some other names to identify these bandits: koyok, kampak, or rampok. 
There were also bajingan, petty thieves (in the contemporary Indonesian 
term we may call them penjahat kelas teri), begal and pencoleng. Groneman 
was largely concerned with the current prevailing situation that deteriorated 
due to the Dutch extensive control over the society. The extensive control 
was blamed since it led to cruel exploitation of the indigenous population 
by Europeans and Chinese. Such exploitation caused increasing misdeed, 
banditry, rebellion and violence. 
Some parts of Java were really notorious for outlawry. Java's North 
Coast, Banyumas, Kediri-Madiun and the Greater Batavia were only a few 
to mention. In 1919 and 1920 a total of 170 'rampokpartijen' (bands of 
robbers) were reported to have wandered in the district of Meester Cornelis 
alone.55 We may follow the idea that the growing landlessness and ruin of 
the peasants in the turning of the twentieth century along with numerous 
resistances were several causing-factors behind the banditry. Boeka admitted 
that there was a high degree of insecurity in Java, which caused unfavorable 
circumstances to the morality of the population and led to disgraceful 
situations.56 C. Amand, a tobacco planter, reported that cattle theft, 
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extortion, opium smuggling, violence, and especially intimidation were daily 
phenomena. His report may offer us some curiosities about the rural world 
in Java. Furthermore, it is not surprising to discover that wide-ranging 
networks of rural crime constructed the framework of Javanese villages as 
Amand stated: 'the more thieves live in a desa, the greater the advantage to 
the kepala (head)'.57 Carel Poensen, a Dutch missionary who spent thirty 
years in Java suggested that even though Javanese had been Muslim for 
centuries, most of them or bangsa abangan never prayed. Pious Muslims 
have been (or at least were) a minority and they have been distancing 
themselves from the majority of the society. 58 
Back to the banditry, it seems that banditry was prevalent in Java 
because mostly of peasant's protest. Banditry has even been identified as the 
simplest form of rebellion due to its difficulty for the authority to handle. 59 
In peasant's protest, the role of informal leaders cannot be neglected. The 
religious leaders, such as kiai in pesantren or guru (religious teachers) often 
assumed political leadership. They w re extensively believed to possess 
mystical attributes and magical abilities that made them enjoyed charismatic 
power and a high social position in society. Most bandits who had been 
farmers before became robbers usually learned (berguru) ilmu (literally 
knowledge, it can also mean magical science or martial arts) in pesantren or 
other religious institutions not only for religious ilmu, but undoubtedly also 
for ilmu kebal (invulnerability). For instance, kiai in Banten not only taught 
Islamic religious learning, but also martial arts. Pupils who were more 
talented in practicing martial arts became known as jawara.60 Kiai  had to be 
a leader of people whom the Dutch and later the Islamic modernist 
movement disliked; because he led them in a direction they considered 
narrow and conservative.61 We have to remember that in the course of few 
decades, in Banten, there was an intensification of fanaticism in pesantren 
circles and a hostile and aggressive attitude came to be ingrained into the 
santri (pupils) towards both the foreigners and the priyayi.62 However, it did 
not automatically turn the foreigners and the nobles into the victims. Most 
victims were simply farmers. Like what Blok suggests, bandits usually lived 
close to their victims. In fact, some of them lived in the same village and 
some others were even close neighbors.63 Bandits directed their actions 
against property and people. Forms of violence were embodied and were 
unavoidably common. Even if bandits acted upon the rich, they did not 
give their booties to the poor. One of the most legendary bandit figures in 
colonial Java, the notorious Pitung, who operated in Batavia and who has 
been believed as the Indonesian Robin Hood and has been romantically 
depicted as a hero in the struggle against the corrupt coalition between the 
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local aristocracies and the Dutch administration in many movies, was not 
more than a common robber, an outlav,,. After his death, he in fact became 
more famous as stories, ballads, and lenong performances (popular 
traditional play in Jakarta) have passed down his tales. However, no 
evidence has been found that Pitung distributed his loots to the poor.64 
Therefore, Hobsbawm' s romanticized social bandits were far from reality. 
Banditry was very difficult to suppress. Although after the 
Europeans came, practices of headhunting, running amok and cannibalism 
were successfully eradicated, banditry was somewhat complicated to 
eliminate. The colonial authority even had to send Marechaussee65 to the 
Netherland East Indies in order to battle rampant banditry in the period 
when peace still reigned between 1920 and 1940.66 It was certainly a very 
extraordinary situation since in colonial Java solving crimes was largely an 
aristocracy responsibility or in other words, the regents, wedana (regent's 
assistant), and assistant wedana who formed the upper level of the 
aristocracy administrative structure were charged by the Dutch 
administration with identifying people who threatened rust en orde (peace 
and order). It was the assistant wedana, the aristocratic official who was most 
responsible for conducting a criminal investigation in his sub district.67 
We now turn to jagabaya. ]agabaya appeared as police in villages. 
They were officially assistants to the police chief. Their task was to,guard 
against offences and they were active in connection with crimes such as 
murders, thefts, arson, brigandage, and fights among villagers.68 They were 
not ordinary villagers due to their ability in magical and martial arts. Their 
profession was crime, both its perpetration and detection, and they could 
offer their services for anyone who could pay them. As rural police, they 
could make use communai property and were exempted from routine 
compulsory services. Villagers may pay jagabaya secret agents. Alternatively, 
jagabaya work individually for their livelihood. They had an ambiguous 
relationship with the rural population; they were both feared and admired. 
Some exercised a virtual reign of terror in their regions, but others were 
seen as champions of peasant rights for their struggle against the Dutch and 
the aristocracies. 69 
In line with an old belief of Javanese tradition, using thieves to catch 
thieves, jagabaya were seen as a possible solution in eradicating banditry. 
The colonial authority via local administrations made use of these 
intermediaries to enforce local peace. ]agabaya could be employed since they 
had broader range in encountering with elements in society. Underworld in 
rural areas (alam peteng) was hardly known by ordinary villagers. It does not 
mean, however, that this world was not likely to penetrate. There were 
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lower village functionaries whose duty was to guard villages from criminals. 
These functionaries who were called kapetengan, often worked together with 
jagabaya. Sometimes these kapetengan were jagabayathemselves. There was 
no strict division between the good guy and the bad guy. ]agabaya were fond 
of gathering in opium dens. They were also in favor of gambling and 
prostitution. The encounter with individuals from alam peteng created a 
beneficial side for jagabaya. They were aware of what was happening in the 
secret society and thus were employed by any party whose interests were 
infiltrating alam peteng. 
In alam peteng, band of robbers might fall into three main types, 
mating krowodan, maling tengah and mating ketut. Mating krowodan or casual 
thieves formed the largest of these categories. They were mostly non-
professional criminals. Mating tengah frequently acted alone and hardly ever 
roamed far places or in other words, they had limited scopes. Mating ketut or 
more known as kecu frequently operated in gangs and ventured in far places 
from their home. They were dangerous and feared.70 The kecuusually knew 
each other if they had worked together in the past, but if they did not work 
together it was not always the case that they recognized each other. They did 
not merge in one vast group, but sometimes they connected to each other 
when they were fond of each other's banditry plans. In some cases the 
bandits put janur kuning around their heads as a sign of recognition, or as an 
image of hate. 71 
Even though bands of robbers could be so violent, they were 
inclined to use non-violent methods in their operation. Violent actions 
appeared if there was no other way to avoid it. They preferred to use several 
kinds of mantra and other variants of magical-mystics to cast deep sleep on 
the victims (aji sirep). Cautious thieves also complied with spirits, 
particularly ancestral spirits, guardian spirits and those spirits believed to 
watch over certain days of the week. The leaders were usually endowed with 
mystifying powers that the followers had a strong conviction that their 
leaders were really able to emanate magical powers. They were also 
equipped with jimat (amulets) to reject bala (calamities) and evil spirits 
directed to them. 72 
The idea of charisma is well known in Indonesian society. It was not 
only the religious elites who were assumed to possess charismatic power, but 
also underworld leaders. Leader-follower relations in bands of robbers 
mirrored those of guru-murid (teachers-disciples) in religious circles of the 
pesantren or tarekat world, allowing the leaders to enhance their power. 
Bandit chiefs usually possessed jimat that provided them with 
invulnerability and invisibility through ziarah (pilgrimages) to holy graves or 
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holy places, such as gunung keramat (sacred mountain), huge and old trees or 
big stones. Ziarah to those sites was also thought to indicate the time when 
robberies may be committed or the methods to execute the burglary. Due to 
the charisma possessed by the leaders, the followers became loyal and 
obedient to them. A benggol, (a leader of a band of robbers) in rural Java 
frequently led his gang until he was too old to be in charge of his band or 
until he died. 
The colonial administration attempted to eradicate banditry by 
arresting kecu gangs. For instance, under the reign of Sultan Hamengku 
Buwono V, shortly after the Java War began, a band of robbers under its 
leader, Gobang Kinosek was captured. The members of the gang had very 
eerie and frightening nicknames, such as Kandang Jinongkeng, Dadoeng 
Sineret and Pentung Pinanggul. Pentung Pinanggul for example, means a 
cudgel bearing in a shoulder, while Gobang Kinosek indicates a big and 
sharp dagger ready to use. These scary names were designated to frighten 
their victims, mostly peasants who could easily be affected. For the 
authorities, it was not their names that caused problems, but their 
misdeeds. Gobang Kinosek and his gang were chased and killed, and their 
heads were separated from their bodies to show other bandits and potential 
criminals that harsh punishments could be executed for such malicious 
thugs. In some way, the efforts of the government faced unexpected 
situations. The populations eventually admired these outlaws by visiting 
their graves and honored them, especially during Ruwah (Sha'aban, the eight 
month of the Islamic calendar). 73 
The Gobang Kinosek case, in which a ruthless sentence was 
performed, was only a few exceptions. The prevailing conditions gave us an 
. impression that the authorities were unable to cope with crimes in rural 
Java, especially in areas without European inhabitants. Most thieves were 
free to re-operate albeit they were previously detained. 74 In practice, 
ordinary bandits and other kinds of bandits were not easy to distinguish. In 
the following pages we will encounter with jago, jawara and preman who 
have also been considered as types of social protest and rebellion. 
D. Jago: Master of Underworld
Jago are undoubtedly the most notorious and discussed strongmen 
in the literature. A significant number of studies have examined jago 
whether the authors of these studies are interested in violence, protest 
movements, or power brokerage in colonial Java, the Netherlands East 
Indies or Indonesia. While the term may offer a common perception for 
scholars working on subjects ranging from history, anthropology or 
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sociology, it can also invoke a sense of anxiety from scholars of criminology, 
politics and area studks. It is not only that the term may be vague, but also 
that it can be abused. Since the term jago has been widely used and also 
mistreated, I am also concerned with how the term has been embedded and 
perceived in the literature dealing with subjects I have mentioned. 
]ago literally means cock or fighting cock. The use of the word 'jago' 
does not always have negative connotations. In the contemporary period, 
one, for instance, can refer to a mathematician as 'jago matematika', 
although certainly to identify an infamous thug who commits crimes, one 
may use 'jagoan'. Though jago were notorious in colonial Java, almost every 
region had its own word to identify such figures, such as brengseng in 
Banyumas; warok in Ponorogo; bromocorah in Kediri; bangkrengan or gento in 
Tegal; tenggaong in Pemalang; jawara in Banten, Batavia and West Java. 
The historical roots of the jago lie in the pre-colonial period, during 
the time of royal wars and periods of violence in Javanese history. 75 Their 
new roles, however, emerged and peaked during the colonial period. Jago 
only existed in central and east Java. Similar groups in other regions 
definitely existed. Nonetheless, they had particular names. Some authors 
have incorrectly addressed similar groups as jago. For instance, in Greater 
Jakarta area, the term jawara was used, instead of jago. 76 Jago were more than 
simple rural criminals,77 they were known mostly for their role as power 
brokers. The term jago is also frequently confused with jagoan (tough men). 
Indonesians may call present strongmen as jagoan, instead of jago. Jago is an 
adjective or noun to identify someone as being tough (in fighting) or smart 
(in science), for instance. Groups or an individual who act like jago are 
mostly called jagoan. This term has both positive and negative connotations. 
Although it seems unimportant, identifying a particular group with other 
names may be misleading and may lead to misunderstanding. Therefore, 
what I discuss here is the jago groups who roamed and settled in colonial 
Java. 
In East Java jago found a comfortable haven, often acting as power 
brokers. They were also known as patang, kebayan, weri or btater. They were 
usually leaders of a peer group. Occasionally, a patang could surpass the 
charisma of a village headman. This charisma also extended to the 
population at large as well. 78 Patang, however, did not enjoy their time of 
power for a long time. When the colonial administration ended 
Cuhuurstdsd (cultivation system) in 1870, the authorities removed patang 
from their previous function as agents for corvee labor. The function was 
replaced by weri who were employed by the Dutch administration to 
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provide information to them. Weri thus acted as spies giving information 
about what was happening in villages. For the villagers, weri were called 
blater and this group numbered around 4,000 to 5,000 at the beginning of 
the twentieth century only in Madiun residency. 79 
Jago in their simplest form could also be criminals. Bands of robbers 
usually were led by a strong and sakti (magical power-possessing) boss. This 
headman formed an underworld network with other leaders of the similar 
groups. The networks as well as the bands were relatively loose in structure 
with individuals centered on the leader. The followers were hardly 
considered jago since there was only one 'jagoan' in a gang though networks 
of jago were structurally common. These individuals or anak buah 
(underlings) could move to other gangs and took an oath to be faithful and 
serve their new leader if the old gang was disbanded or the leader was 
captured or if they were convinced that the new group could provide them 
with more opportunities. Patronage was thus exceptionally evident within 
these bands. The leader preserved his position by dispensing material 
rewards to leading members of the group. Personal links between anak buah 
and the leader could exist and were characterized by a large degree of 
dependencies on the assistance of the leader to the anak buah. 
Like the notorious bandit Pitung in Batavia, jago were not righteous 
thugs. Jago, when they committed crime with their bands, did not rob from 
the well-off and instead distribute the booties to the unfortunate. Farmers 
or peasants in general, were easy prey for criminal bands. Cattle rustlings 
were quite common in Pasuruan, for instance. In 1909 there were 1382· 
cattle rustlings, while the number dropped off to 778 in 1914, 189 in 1919 
and only 63 in 1924.80 The number continuously declined for one possible 
reason. Sugarcane (tebu) estates were introduced by Chinese landlords who 
leased the land from various regents since the last decade of eighteenth 
century. One of these Chinese entrepreneurs was Han Kik Ko (1766-1813), 
the fifth son of Captain Han Bwee Kong whose estate around 1808 was 
including twelve· villages and 2.538 persons. 8 1 During the heyday of the 
estates, a considerable number of people earned money by renting their 
cattle-carts to the estates as their means of livelihood. The abundance of 
cattle attracted bands of robbers to operate in Pasuruan. The development 
of transportation at the onset of the twentieth century, however, reduced 
the significance of cattle-carts. Consequently, cattle rustlings became less 
common.82 
In another form of crime, jago might commit various forms of 
extortion. Even though fairly loose in structure, the jago bands had their 
own territory with a hierarchy of leaders and sponsors and characterized by 
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a distinct specializations of functions. Meetings in amusement centres, such 
as opium dens, prostitution quarters or simply warung (food stalls) served as 
means of discussion of their plans. They arranged operations of extortion. 
]ago were aware that the colonial authority was unable to penetrate in the 
lowest level of administration, the village. Daendels had created a 
centralistic government. All government affairs were arranged from Batavia. 
The colonial government based the administrative mechanism on a 
Western model, placing sultans and their families under the Dutch colonial 
government, and converting them into bureaucrats. Daendels's purpose was 
to run the government under direct rule, so that he could rule the people 
without the local rulers as intermediary. Nevertheless, the effect of this 
policy was not great. After the Daendels era, or more precisely after the Java 
war, the Dutch colonial government seemed to look back to indigenous 
people to run lower administrative areas where the indigenous 
administrative system relied on personal relations. The village became the 
lowest administrative unit, and was headed by a chief paid with a plot of 
village land. During such an indirect rule, jago offered 'protection' to a 
certain village. As a result, the village was safe from cattle rustlings or 
ordinary robberies. This protection was not free and indicates the most 
notorious form of extortion committed by jago. 
As extortionists, jago also commit the crime in a more soft and 
elegant way. They would not undertake any misdeeds in a certain village 
and in fact would 'protect' the neighborhood against robberies. This offer 
once again was not for free. In exchange, they received exemption from 
taxes. For being guardians, they were admired by the people. 83 Not 
surprisingly, since they knew many of these defenseless elements of villagers, 
a number of jago could manage to become village heads by utilizing their 
role as the village guardians. Consequently, those villages were taken 
control by new generations of jago who benefited from the situation. 
Jago might also act as power brokers or intermediaries for there were 
increasing demands for such persons at all levels of society. Intermediaries 
appeared between cultural ideals and the political realities of governing a 
society, bridging an ideological gap. The aristocracy's ideal, and that of all 
formal power holders in Java, was one of a symbolic center, protective, 
passive and aloof from day-to-day affairs. Just as the demands of the Dutch 
and the aristocracies could not be fulfilled without active intermediaries, as 
they · lacked personnel, the peasantry also saw a need for more active 
leadership in order to link them with the outer world. This was found in 
the jago. Relative distance from the formal focus of power gave 
intermediaries less need for charisma, and more scope for direct action. An 
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intermediary is well illustrated in Groneman · s Een Ketjoegeschiedenis. The 
intermediary is portrayed not only, for instance, as being wealthier than a 
village head, but also more than an ordinary thief. He is fully aware of what 
he is doing since he is respected by the villagers. 84 
When they acted as brokers, jago normally operated against the 
population and they succeeded in spreading fear among the local 
inhabitants in colonial Java.85 Regents in Java had to come to an agreement 
with jago in their territory. As a result, jago in this way became the spies of 
the regents in their area and they would not be afraid to accept the role of 
the strong arm of the law. Jago were almost always useful as spies86 and 
collaborators of regents. Therefore, they succeeded in remaining outside the 
reach of European administration and creating their own power base in the 
shadow of the colonial state. 87 
]ago might learn pencak silat (martial arts) with certain guru. It is also 
possible that they knew a few simple Arabic words. In Pekalongan, there 
were many kiai in the rural areas who were sakti and were able to transfer 
the ilmu, reflecting the strong magic-religious elements in rural Islam. 88 
Lenggaong in Pekalongan, Brebes and T egal were deeply involved in the 
rural revolution in October 1945. They were to a large degree tied to 
Islam.89 Elsewhere, militia groups in the Greater Batavia area also mastered 
pencak silat skills, including ilmu kanuragan (invulnerability). Unlike 
common jago who were not dukun (magicians/shamans/healers), these 
revolutionaries could also created jimat with the same amount of kesaktian. 
The colonial administration was concerned with the increasing roles 
of the jago. Batavia, for instance sent Snouck Hurgronje to Madiun to 
investigate a case involving the regent, Brotodiningrat. Snouck found 
several leaders of the jago, among them kiai and dukun. According to 
Snouck all these prominent jago had the reputation of being kebal 
(invulnerable) and taught others the means to achieve invulnerability. 
Although it would be hard to prove their involvement in any subversive 
designs of the regent of Madiun, or of any crime, Snouck advised the 
government to exile the most prominent jago. According to Snouck they 
had the reputation of being fearless even against higher Dutch authority 
and being kebal against bullets and sharp weapons. If the Netherlands East 
Indies government did not take measures against them, then their 
reputation of being magically invulnerable would be enhanced and lead to 
more unrest.90 Jago frequently gained their reputation from the fear he 
inspired in the local populations. Once he had proven his power, people 
would not dare to oppose his hasty reputation. For the official regional 
rulers jago were the prime instrument to reinforce their grip on their 
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district. Thus, besides the official hierarchy of local rulers, an indispensable 
informal circuit operated, in which jago operated as agent for the higher 
authorities.91 
The inability to strengthen the colonial administration at the local 
level and the geographic isolation of life in the countryside created an 
administrative vacuum in which the jago guild established' itself. The 
intimidation and violence that emanated from this network turned itself 
primarily against its own people who, in order to avoid a fate worse than 
death, decided it was better to buy off the threat. Furthermore, although 
officially jago were considered to have played only a marginal role, in reality 
they engaged in a more significant role at the centre of local life, utilizing 
the space provided by the central government, and filling it with violence. 
Local violence was part of an almost steady tradition in Java since, until 
recently, no central administration had the power to control society 
completely.92 
E. ]awara: Feared and Admired Champions 
T ubagus Chasan Sochib, we first encountered in the beginning of 
our discussion, was unquestionably the most influential and renowned 
jawara in Banten at the moment. As an old man (born in 1930), people may 
assume that he is an ordinary veteran. He is indeed a veteran in jawara 
world, entrepreneurship and a veteran in the sense that he comes from 
Generation 45, a generation that struggled in Indonesian Revolution 1945-
1949. Ratu Atut Chosiyah, the former governor of the Ban ten Province is 
one of his daughters. 
Perhaps the most influential strongmen in the socio-political world 
of Indonesia is jawara. The New Order administration provided them with 
opportunities to expand themselves into socio-political realms. Era 
Reformasi, often characterized by social instability and insecurity, even has 
placed the position of this group on a firm basis. ]awara have long 
entrenched themselves in Bantenese society. Like jago, the roots can be 
traced back to the colonial era. Unlike jago, however, jawara have 
strengthened their position in society. 
Throughout history, jawara in Banten display a long continuity in 
the various roles they have played, from their mythical origins as 
bodyguards of kings and ulama, as instigators of rebellions, to their 
mobilization as security personnel for political parties and the ruling elite. 
Kartodirdjo argued that the jawara consisted largely of people without 
permanent occupation who were often engaged in criminal activities. 93 A 
report from a Dutch resident, Craemer, in his memorie van overgave of 1930s, 
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told us that jawara originally evolved from orok lanjang, a youth organization 
in the district of Menes. This organization then developed, spreading 
outside Menes and becoming a bodyguard organization that was notorious 
for being involved in fighting and stirring up trouble. 94 
]awara were thought to be the pupils of kiai. Kiai in Banten not only 
taught Islamic religious learning, but also gave martial arts as one of the 
lessons. Pupils who were more talented in practicing martial arts became 
known as jawara. Even though they left the pesantren after they graduated, 
they still considered the kiai as their teachers. 95 Perhaps that is why a 
considerable number of jawara believed that they are the khadam (servant) 
of kiai. 
The close relationship between jawara and ulama (religious leaders) 
was crucial throughout the late nineteenth century, when revolts against the 
Dutch colonial government erupted throughout Banten, and again during 
the struggle for independence. Both were central figures in village life. The 
relationship between them was at times troubled, as jawara, to a large extent 
represented pre-Islamic traditions sometimes considered to be at odds with 
Islam.96 Between them, there were also intermediaries known as ulama 
jawara. This term could be applied either to jawara who established 
themselves as religious teachers, or to ulama who mastered martial arts. In 
either case such figures played an important role as mediating cultural 
brokers.97 
Moreover, both jawara and ulama jawara in the vast network of 
pesantren were also influential in the spread of martial arts. Perhaps martial 
arts in Banten are closely intertwined with the life of tarekat. In some cases 
jawara joined tarekat as part of a sincere spiritual quest. Nevertheless, more 
commonly tarekat and the techniques that they were taught were means 
toward obtaining the various kinds of esoteric knowledge that were 
considered essential for success as jawara. Similarly, some martial arts 
teachers conducted tarekat type communal devotions.98 
According to Hudaeri, jawara played roles mainly with leadership 
aspects, such as becoming jaro (lurah/village head), jagakersa (penjaga 
keamanan desa/village security), martial arts teachers, and teachers of 
magic.99 The jaro figures who first appeared during the reign of the 
Sultanate, still existed in recent days. Certainly, during the New Order Era, 
these figures were well known for their leadership in mobilizing local 
villagers to vote for the ruling party in general elections. It is interesting to 
note that many jawara often took some verses from Quran, and thus they 
believed that the power they had originally came from kiai and that the 
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power as well as the jawara themselves were considered 'white'. 1 0 0
Nonetheless, I argue that this view is somewhat incorrect since both a 
considerable number of 'white' and 'black' jawara have used black magic up 
to the present day. 
The emergence of jawara was not a result of oppression and 
grinding poverty in Banten. Though they may have joined in spontaneous 
food riots, or may have committed criminal acts, people facing starvation 
are too busy just surviving to plot the overthrow of government or to 
formulate a blueprint for an alternative social order. The emergence of the 
jawara supports this proposition and the assertion that the potential for 
violent social protest corresponds to relative rather than absolute 
deprivation. ]awara groups who were considered to be bandits were reduced 
to starvation or to total impoverishment; they suffered a significant decline 
in their social standing and economic well being. 
Moreover, their relationship with the rural population was 
ambiguous, as can be seen in the ambiguity of the jawara figure in the folk 
etymology (which can also be considered to be an abbreviation) of the 
words: jghat (evil), wani (brave), rampog (robber) and iago (champion), wani, 
(brave), and ramah (friendly). Else Ensering classified jawara into two 
groups: the jawara-teri, in reference to petty thieves and robbers, and the 
jawara-gecleh, who practice pencak silat (martial arts), use weapons, and 
pursue mystical development under the guidance of a kiai, culminating in 
obtaining invulnerability. 101 
In Banten, ulama and jawara were co-opted into the political 
machines of Golkar. The recognition of ulama by the governing party was 
manifested by the establishment of  Satkar Ulama (Satuan Karya Ulama · the 
Ulama Work Squad) in 1971, while jawara were organised into Satkar 
Pendekar (Satuan Karya Pendekar · the Martial Art Work Squad) in 1972. 
By entering the state and adjusting to the new atmosphere of the political 
situation, they created new positions where they gradually expanded their 
power, status and wealth. 
The patron-client relationships in Banten in the New Order Era 
perhaps were best identified in the ties between the state and jawara. 
Throughout history, jawara had always worked individually or in small 
bands. Whilst there were informal networks of individual jawara, usually 
based upon allegiances and loyalties to particular ulama, there had never 
been a formal structured organization. Satkar Pendekar, renamed Persatuan 
Pendekar Persilatan clan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia (PPPSBBl-the 
Indonesian Association of Bantenese Men of Martial Arts, Art and 
Culture), was established as a forum for jawara and martial arts schools 
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throughout Banten as well as those in Jakarta. From its inception PPPSBBI 
identified 'nation and state' with Golkar, with whom they had had a close 
relationship since the 1977 general election. l t  was largely due to the 
influence of Tubagus Chasan Sochib who, since the early 1970s, was a local 
parliamentarian for the Golkar faction, and certainly a prominent figure in 
h . · 102 t e 1awara commumty. 
Sochib was born in Serang in 1930. He has three brothers, Tubagus 
Basuni, Tubagus Syatibi and Entus Sibli, and one sister, Ojah Faojah. They 
are all children of Tubagus Sochib and Nyi Ratu Rofiah. He attended 
several pesantren during his childhood. O f  the pesantren, the Pesantren 
Pani · is in Jiput, Pandeglang was his first boarding school. His parents 
entrusted him to Kiai Cholil. During his stay, he showed braveness and 
intelligence, an attitude that would benefit his future career in many areas 
of society. In the revolutionary era, Sochib went to Pesantren Cadasari, 
under the guidance of Kiai lcot. Shortly after the acceptance to that 
pesantren, he joined Hisbullah, a guerrilla warfare unit, whose commanders 
were Kiai Abdullah and Ayip Samin. After the revolutionary period came to 
an end, he embarked upon a more serious working life in 1967 (after a 
couple of years dealing with a number of small businesses) by providing 
logistical support to the Kodam Siliwangi. Two years later he founded a 
construction company, PT Sinar Ciomas Raya, which frequently won 
government tenders for road and market construction projects. His 
involvement spread to the Krakatau Steel State Company, and to tourism 
and real estate, while holding key positions in associations, such as the 
Regional and Central Chambers of Commerce and Trade (Kadin) and the 
Indonesian National Contractors· Association (Gapensi), putting his men 
on their local executive committees. 103 
The position of Sochib in the PPPSBBI as chairman is the peak of  
his vertical mobility. That he was a kepala kuli (chief labourer) and then 
gained a more respectable status by becoming an entrepreneur showed this 
mobility. After he had reached the top, he moved horizontally, increasing 
his social mobility. Even though PPPSBBI is not a wing organization of 
Golkar, the organization was essential in the political context of Golkar. 
Golkar was a crucial and strategic element for Sochib expanding his 
horizontal mobility. As a man with power-both social power and power 
through violence-through Golkar he had a wide sphere to increase his 
political access. To strengthen his domination in Golkar, he placed jawara 
as cadres in the organization with the banyan tree as its symbol. These 
cadres held several important positions at the district and municipal levels. 
Apparently, those who had had experience as local officials were favored by 
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him. However, according to Suhaedi, to be actively engaged in Golkar was 
not his choice in career, although in reality he was a member of the advisory 
board. For Sochib, Golkar was an instrument to expand and secure his 
business, not mainly a tool to obtain political power. 104 Therefore, through 
Kadin and Gapensi, Sochib could control the companies operated in 
Banten, due to the fact that certifications from Kadin and Gapensi were 
necessary for government procurement. Sochib utilized this to coordinate 
projects in Banten and the coordination brought him more money. 
Another side to this situation is that it led jawara under his control to 
become his (sub) contractors and receive a share of his profits. 105 
I would argue that the PPPSBBI was the first organization to spread 
his power in the political constellation, and that the political constellation 
was the vehicle introducing him to a bigger business world than he had 
moved in before. One of the main purposes of the establishment of the 
PPPSBBI was to channel the aspirations of jawara away from self-interest 
and criminality towards more · constructive· activities, that contributed to 
the New Order· s program of social and economic development. 
Encompassing over 70 perguruan and debus groups, by the mid 1990s the 
organization claimed a membership of 170,000. In the words of Sochib, 'in 
the past jawara only fought for themselves, their group or tribe, however via 
the PPPSBBI together we fight for the nation and the state'. Commonly 
known as jawara pembangunan (development jawara), they worked to ensure 
Golkar's supremacy. Taking advantage of the long-standing influence of 
jawara in village life, Golkar, through the General Ali Murtopo, utilized 
PPPSBBI to secure support for the party in Banten. In addition, as the 
general chairman of the pendekar106 organization and one of the executive 
committee members of Satkar Ulama, Sochib could act as bridge between 
the military, bureaucracy and Golkar, as well as the informal world of 
Banten. 107 
Another prominent jawara figure in Bantenese society is Maman 
Rizal. Like many other jawara, after mastering martial arts, he went to 
Jakarta to gain better chances for his livelihood. In 196 7 he began his 
political career by entering Sekber Golkar and later, in 1970, joined the 
MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong - The Mutual 
Assistance Families Society), a wing organization of Golkar. After returning 
to Banten, he became a member of the Pandeglang branch of Golkar. In 
Pandeglang he was appointed Ketua Divisi Pemenangan Pemilu clan 
Pengkaderan (the Head of Winning the General Election and Forming of 
Cadres Division or simply the Success Team) in 1987-1988. His wide 
network, encompassing other jawara with many followers, was a basic 
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reason for him to hold several important positions in Golkar. Therefore, his 
influence was seen as an essential factor for his position in Golkar. In 
addition, he also served as treasurer of M K G R  from 1975 until 1987. His 
political career in Golkar gradually improved with his appointment as 
treasurer of the Serang branch of Golkar, from 1988-2000. For Rizal, 
Golkar had political and economical benefits that formed a structural base 
for broadening his power. As an entrepreneur, he has become involved in 
many government-financed projects. Meanwhile, in the jawara world, he is 
now a leading figure in the Kebudayaan Seni Tari clan Silat Indonesia 
Tjimande Tari Kolot Kebon Ojeruk Hilir (Kesti TTKKDH-the Indonesian 
Dancing and Martial Arts Tjimande Tari Kolot Kebon Djeruk Hilir 
Association). This organization is widely known among the Bantenese, and 
thus facilitates spreading the organization to villages. Consequently, Kesti 
TTKKDH contributed to the victories of Golkar during the New Order 
era's general elections. Golkar, however, rendered a service bestowing 
members of the organization positions in the local parliament, as well as 
conferring big favors on them to help them become successful 
entrepreneurs. Like Sochib, the economical aspect is a main reason behind 
his activities. 108 
The fall of  Suharto in 1998 led to changes in the jawara world. 
Okamoto Masaaki has emphasized the significance of jawara roles in 
Pilkada Banten 2006 (the 2006 Direct Election of Governor of Banten). In 
bringing about the victory of Ratu Atut Chosiyah, jawara groups under the 
leadership of Sochib made use various means to bring this jawara-like strong 
minded and confident woman to become the first female governor of  
Banten. The various methods ranging from publicizing the results of  two 
polls conducted by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Institute) 
and Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Circle) to intervening 
in Golkar · s regional convention on 2 July 2006 as well as performing the 
same actions in PDI-P' s special regional working meeting on 5 April 2006 
(the result is that Atut became the sole candidate for the governor seat from 
the two major parties). They also capitalized on voters' materialism (ranging 
from jualrbeli suara/ sell-buy votes before the election day until executing 
serangan fajar-dawn attack/the buying of votes at dawn on the election day), 
utilising PPPSBBI and Badan Pembina Potensi Keluarga Besar Banten 
(BPPKB - the Agency to Develop the Potentialities of the Bantenese), and 
co-opted young intellectuals, such as activists from Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam (HMI - Islamic Students· Association), Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam 
Indonesia (PMII - Indonesian Islam Student Movement) and Komite 
Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI - National Committee for Indonesian 
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Youth). 109 The last strategy actually mirrored the tactics that Golkar used 
during the Suharto administration in gaining victories during general 
elections. 
F. Preman: The Present Free Men
Nowadays, perhaps the most well known group I discuss in this 
paper is preman. Elderly people who were aware of what was happening in 
their daily life before 1990s might not expect that the term preman would 
have a different meaning. The term initially referred to a policeman or a 
soldier who did not wear his uniform or in other words, he was in his 
civilian dress (berpakaian preman). The opposite of it is berpakaian dinas 
(wearing uniform). The term also assumed another meaning; preman meant 
something in personal ownership, not belonged to the state, such as mobil 
preman (private car) and thus the opposite is mobil dinas or mobil pemerintah 
(state's car or government's car). Consequently, when Van der Kroef in 
1985 spoke about Petrus killings (penembakan misterius or penembak 
misterius/mysterious shooting or mysterious rifleman), he did not mention 
any single word of 'preman'. He proposed that the targets were bromocorah or 
gali-gali/ gali (gabungan anak-anak liar, literally means gangs of wild kids). 110 
Other accounts after 1990 also mentioned the term gali for the victims. 111 If 
Petrus occurred after 1990s, the victims have called 'preman'. 
Since jago were considered as 'local hero', 'power brokers', 
'criminals' or 'people who posses invulnerability and master martial arts' 112, 
preman may only inherit 'criminal' aspects of the jago. People like Yapto 
Soerjosoemarno and Y orrys Raweyai through Pemuda Pancasila 
organization (PP - Pancasila Youth), however, may also inherit 'power 
brokers' aspects of the jago due to the fact that they could become the 
bridge between the Suharto government in order to secure his power 
through supporting Golkar and the expectation of the preman of PP to 
fulfill its mission to raise their welfare. 113 
If jago were the grandfather of preman, 114 then gali may be the father 
of preman. Gali were recognized by their tattoos. In fact, this distinguished 
between orang biasa (commoners) and penjahat (criminals) or residivis 
(recidivists) during the Petrus time. Gali were petty criminals. They could be 
active criminals, ex-convicts or recidivists. Gali were, however, history. By 
the time Petrus ended in 1985, gali also came to an end. Ryter suggests two 
differences between gali and preman. First, gali was a collective 
phenomenon: the threat was that of roving gangs. Preman, meanwhile, can 
stand as lone figures. Second, in contrast with the sense that gali were 
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understood to be unruly and unauthorized, the term preman has retained a 
quasi-official ring. 115 I, however, would argue that despite their name, 
'gabungan' (gang), a gali could also stand as a lone figure. Not only that the 
death squads who killed the gali only killed them one by one during the 
operation, and thus not kill a whole group, but also, more importantly, the 
authorities did not distinguish them whether they belonged to a particular 
group or operated alone. 116 Preman, though can stand as a lone figure; have 
to rely strongly on other people. If they lack protection, they remain 'lonely 
wolves to be quickly dispatched' .117 PP members, for instance, needed to 
offer services to the authorities not only that they expected to get something 
in return, such as being able to control revenues generated in the informal 
economy, especially parking and the management of informal traders, 118 but 
also they needed protection from the state in order to survive. 
Gali, as we know them mostly from Petrus, could bequeath their 
tough characteristic to preman. This inheritance has been made possible due 
to the fact that preman and the state need each other. Under Suharto 
regime, for instance, perdekkingan or perbekkingan (the backing system) was 
extremely common. The state, usually through the police and armed forces 
made use of preman groups to secure their private businesses. These 
businesses range from BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik Negara/state-owned 
company), cooperatives and foundations, non-institutionalised businesses 
carried out by ex-high officials of the police and armed forces, until private 
institutions that affiliate themselves with the police and armed forces. In 
exchange, preman groups not only could survive, but more significantly, they 
were financially supported by these state officials 119 State premanisme, like 
Tim Lindsey has suggested was the nature of the New Order. Furthermore, 
he argues that under Suharto, power was equivalent to wealth. It was 
secured through violence, and centered on the elite that were equivalent to 
the state itself. To secure this equivalence the New Order created a parallel 
'secret' state to ensure the elite access to illegal or extra legal funds, and thus 
it was through this system that business and administration were really 
carried out. Moreover, rival criminal 'gang' structures linked the political 
and the business elite through the military to preman, which sometimes 
mutated into private armies or militias linked to political and business 
leaders. 120 This system permeated every aspect of public life under the New 
Order, from contracting, to law enforcement, to narcotics, to public 
transport. In simple words, it was a system by which preman having collected 
japrem (illegal rents), in turn pay setoran (rents) to state officials, in return for 
the right to operate. 121 I, however, believe that Lindsey's view suggesting that 
the state's attitude to and use of criminal violence can be tracked down to 
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the revolutionary period is somewhat incorrect. I have already discussed 
about the roots of violence in the previous pages. 
Preman in Jakarta are organized along ethnic lines into permanent 
gangs which control clearly demarcated territories. 122 This also holds true 
for many other big cities in Indonesia. In Surabaya, Madurese and Javanese 
have always fought over territory in Tanjung Perak. In Bandung, preman 
from Priangan area, mostly from Garut, and Banten have constantly clashed 
in Cicaheum or Alun-alun area. 
Like jago, weri, opium farm mata-mata (spy), all in central and east 
Java, 123 preman · s main business is extortion. The extortion range from 
asking money in the street acting as private traffic-controller police (pak 
ogah-the targets are people driving their car and mostly public transport 
drivers); controlling parking places; protecting pickpockets in markets, 
terminals, stations and other public places; until being in charge of 
gambling industry, massage parlors, discotheques and other entertainment 
centers. From the most simple until the most complicated methods, preman 
always need other parties to survive. All operations have to be executed 
smoothly; otherwise the police will become involved. Even if the police find 
out about it, there are always ways to solve the problem. The boss of the 
preman can always negotiate it with the official apparatus, by contributing an 
amount of money. consequently, japrem that become preman's resources will 
finally turn into the officials' incomes. Although the methods of operating 
vary from city to city, however, this pattern is extremely common in 
Indonesia and seems to be able to reinforce after the New Order collapsed. 
G. Conclusion
Violence is a cultural category, a historically developed form of 
construction. The view on violence is always bounded with time and place 
and is largely depended on those involved in it, whether they are the 
offenders and victims, spectators and bystanders or witnesses and 
authorities. Bullfight in Spain that for most people anywhere in the world is 
a fight, is not considered a fight in Spain, but rather as show called corrida 
de taros (the running of bulls).124 Daily crimes are changing and 
classifications and definitions that embody the crimes are not static either 
and thus we should consider violence as a cultural form of construction. 
Street robberies were considered for a long time as thefts, but were recently 
redefined as violent delicts. In former days, violence against individuals, 
including murder, was considered less dreadful and for instance punished 
less severely than crimes against property. Today, the law considers violence 
against individuals as a more serious delict than crimes against property. 125 
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It is in this sense that the violent aspects of the strongmen groups I 
have discussed are not always considered as uncontaminated violence. Like 
headhunting, running amok or carok that are considered as actions of 
expressing ways of ritualistic behaviors, ultimate vindication of honor and 
simply the messages people want to convey, rather than performing 
pointless violence; rampok-bandits when robbed, jago when bridged the 
underworld and upper-world, jawara when capitalized on voters' 
materialism, or preman when extorted, cannot be simply regarded as 
carrying out meaningless violence. Their violent deeds indeed have reflected 
the time and place and more importantly the society where they originate. 
All the four strongmen groups are in fact able to employ their power since 
the society where they come from have helped maintaining their existence. 
Nevertheless, the society cannot be pointed out as the sole party for the 
endurance of these strongmen groups. It is indeed the authorities, from the 
pre-colonial era to the present day who have made use of these covert 
powers, who can be mainly regarded as the defenders and protectors of 
these strongmen groups in Indonesia. 
These strongmen groups have demonstrated a variety of roles, from 
agents of protection to their leading roles as power brokers. The origin of 
these strongmen groups is not fully understood. It seems that it is a 
relatively new phenomenon (perhaps older than a hundred years) and the 
emergence of these strongmen groups in each area may show parallel 
patterns with other groups of strongmen in the Archipelago. 
Whether they become power brokers or criminals, they are outlaws, 
in the sense that the authorities do not wish to touch them. They can make 
allies with criminals, but they can also cooperate with local administrations. 
Everything depends on the demands. They are needed by local authorities 
to maintain peace and order, but they will almost definitely collaborate with 
criminals if there are big targets and easy prey. Nevertheless, they mostly 
make allies with local authorities as their means of livelihood. During the 
colonial period, these local authorities who lost their privileges became their 
main allies. Since there were a significant number of local authorities who 
lost their privileges, not surprisingly, bands of these people could grow and 
expand their territory and allied with local authorities (as described by C. 
Amand). Certainly, to facilitate the coordination between them, these 
strongmen created their own networks (as described by Boeka). By 
establishing these loose networks, their position became stronger and 
complicated and thus created complex condition for colonial authorities to 
eradicate them. Here we witness that these groups were made possible to 
establish and develop due to the weak policies of the colonial 
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administration to accommodate the interests of local and indigenous 
authorities. These processes did not occur at once, but gradually and 
indicated a strong tendency when colonial authorities' policies failed to 
facilitate indigenous people to create strong-based economy and were 
deteriorated due to the absence of strict laws that allowed illegal and violent 
practices happen in society. 
Unlike jago who sustained to practice their business untouched well 
into the 1930s, as long as the manifestation of 'law and order' was not 
openly disrupted, jawara have continued their business up to present day. 
In collaboration with and protected by local officials, jawara have succeeded 
in spreading the fear in Banten, where they have formed an unstable system 
of internally shifting power relationships which challenged the formal 
structures of the state. They are what we call the shadow state. 126 Preman 
who emerged later, have also exercised the same pattern of jawara in 
Banten. The ongoing state formation, such as democratization and 
decentralization allow new emergences of politically autonomous local 
leaders. This process seems to enable or-in fact-to maintain a number of 
deep-rooted social groups which use violence and intimidation as their ways 
of reaching their goals, to continue spreading their socio-economic and 
political influences. 
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